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UNEQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
FOR GIFTED STUDENTS:
ROBBING PETER TO PAY PAUL?
Charles J. Russo*
If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on
America the mediocre education performance that exists today,
we might well have viewed it as an act of war.'
With these provocative words, the National Commission on Ex-
cellence in Education's seminal report, A Nation at Risk: The Im-
perative for Educational Reform,' gave birth to a plethora of
reform reports aimed at reinvigorating the quality of American
schools.3 Previously, the Supreme Court's monumental decision in
Brown v. Board of Education4 served as the impetus to propel local
and national leaders to take steps to ensure equal educational op-
portunities for all students by recognizing that "[t]oday, education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."'
Brown ushered in an era that has led to admirable, yet arguably
incomplete, gains in equal educational opportunities for all chil-
* Joseph Panzer Chair of Education, School of Education and Allied Professions
and Adjunct Professor, School of Law, University of Dayton. B.A. 1972, St. John's
University; M. Div. 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate Conception; J.D. 1983, St.
John's University; Ed.D. 1989, St. John's University.
1. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERA-
TIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 3 (1983) [hereinafter A NATION AT RISK].
2. Id.
3. By the end of the 1980s, the era of reform reports seemed to draw to a close.
For representative major reports, see, for example ERNEST L. BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL:
A REPORT ON SECONDARY EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1983); CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON
ADOLESCENT DEV., TURNING POINTS: PREPARING AMERICAN YOUTH FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (1989); CARNEGIE FORUM ON EDUC. AND THE ECON., A NATION PRE-
PARED: TEACHERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1986); JOHN GOODLAD, A PLACE
CALLED SCHOOL: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE (1984); HOLMES GROUP, To-
MORROW'S TEACHERS: A REPORT OF THE HOLMES GROUP (1989); and THEODORE
SIZER, HORACE'S COMPROMISE: THE DILEMMA OF THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL
(1984).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation was a
denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and that
separate educational facilities were inherently unequal).
5. Id. at 493.
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dren, most notably minorities, 6 females, 7 and students with disabili-
ties.8 However, despite the progress that has been made in the
struggle for educational equality, many exceptional students are
not being fully served.9 A Nation at Risk cogently observed that
"[o]ver half of the population of gifted students do not match their
tested ability with comparable achievement in school."10 The re-
port further suggested that "most gifted students, for example, may
need a curriculum enriched and accelerated beyond the needs of
other students of high ability."1 1
6. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996) (discussing diffi-
culties in implementing desegregation decisions); GARY ORFIELD, SARA SCHLEY, DI-
ANE GLASS & SEAN REARDON, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968 (1993)
(same).
7. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 901-
907, 86 Stat. 235, 373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1968 (1994)) (guar-
anteeing access to sports programs and prohibiting sexual harassment in schools); e.g.,
Frank Brown & Charles J. Russo, Single-Sex Schools, the Law, and School Reform, 31
EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 145 (1999) (examining the recent history of school reform and
analyzing the legal status of single-sex schools); Diane Heckman, Title IX Tapestry:
Threshold and Procedural Issues, 153 EDUC. L. REP. 849 (2001) (focusing on recent
decisions that impact on threshold and procedural aspects of Title IX); Albert S.
Miles, David L Dagley, & Charles J. Russo, University Student-Athlete Codes After
Monroe v. Davis County Board of Education, 138 EDUC. L. REP. 969 (1999) (examin-
ing the application of Title IX principles to sexual assault by student-athletes); Brian
A. Snow et al., The Problem of Determining Title IX Liability, 154 EDUC. L. REP. 1
(2001) (exploring the federal judiciary's solutions to the problem of determining Title
IX liability).
8. The passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children's Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994)), has had a profound impact on
American schools. See also, e.g., Larry D. Bartlett & Scott McLeod, Inclusion and the
Regular Class Teacher Under the IDEA, 128 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1998) (clarifying the
duty and role of the regular classroom teacher in the provision of special education
programming and services in the classroom as provided in the IDEA); Ralph D.
Mawdsley, Standard of Care and Students with Disabilities, 148 EDUC. L. REP. 553
(2001) (exploring the effect of standards of care under tort liability on providing ser-
vices under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Charles J. Russo et al., The
Delivery of Special Education Services in Catholic Schools: One Hand Gives, the Other
Hand Takes Away, 3 CATHOLIC EDUC. J. INQUIRY & PRAC. 375 (2000).
9. This neglect is contrary to the express wishes of Congress. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c)(5)(E)(ii) (Supp. IV 1998) (noting that Congress intended that all children
with disabilities should "be prepared to lead productive, independent, adult lives to
the maximum extent possible"); 20 U.S.C. § 1221 (1994) (declaring that National pol-
icy is "that every citizen is entitled to an education to meet his or her full potential").
In light of these statements, Congressional inaction in safeguarding the rights of the
gifted is, at best, perplexing.
10. A NATION AT RISK, supra note 1, at 8.
11. Id. at 24.
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Aside from commission reports and rhetoric, little has been done
at either the federal or state level to offer appropriate program-
ming for gifted and talented children's12 educational needs. The
poor state of gifted education is reflected in the fact that the most
recent federal study on gifted students reports that states spent
only two cents out of every one hundred dollars in education on
programs for gifted students.1 3 It is questionable whether educa-
tional leaders and policy makers have taken sufficient steps to meet
the educational needs of gifted children.
This Article discusses various challenges in meeting the educa-
tional needs of gifted students. Part I provides a brief overview of
educational perspectives on gifted students. Part II examines stat-
utory developments in the United States dealing with the rights of
12. The term gifted was first used by Lewis Terman who defined gifted students as
those who placed in the top one percent in general intelligence ability on the Stan-
ford-Binet Intelligence Scale or a similar test. LEWIS TERMAN, MENTAL AND PHYSI-
CAL TRAITS OF A THOUSAND GIFTED CHILDREN (1925). For later definitions of
gifted, see, for example, J.A. BORLAND, PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMS
FOR THE GIFTED (1989); RAYMOND B. CAT-rELL, ABILITIES: THEIR STRUCTURE,
GROWTH, AND ACTION (1971); ROBERT F. DEHAAN & ROBERT J. HAVINGHURST,
EDUCATING GIFTED CHILDREN (1957); HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE
THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1983); JANE PIIRTO, TALENTED CHILDREN
AND ADULTS: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION (1999); VALERIE RAMOS-
FORD ET AL., GROWING Up GIFTED 54 (5th ed. 1997); ABRAHAM J. TANNENBAUM,
GIFTED CHILDREN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1983);
Nicholas Colangelo & Garry A. Davis, The Meaning and Making of Giftedness, in
HANDBOOK OF GIFTED EDUCATION 27 (1997); Nicholas Colangelo & Garry A. Davis,
Toward a Differentiated Model of Giftedness and Talent, in HANDBOOK OF GIFTED
EDUCATION 65 (1997); Joseph Renzuli, What Makes Giftedness? Reexamining a Defi-
nition, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Nov. 1978, at 180; Francoys Gagn6, From Giftedness to
Talent: A Developmental Model and Its Impact on the Language of the Field, 18
ROEPER REV. 103 (1995); and A Proposal for Subcategories Within Gifted and Tal-
ented Populations, GIFTED CHILD Q., Apr. 1998, at 87. For a discussion of many of
these definitions, see Kristen F. Stephens & Frances A. Kearns, State Definitions for
the Gifted and Talented Revisited, EXCEPTIONAL CHILD., Jan. 1, 2000, at 219, 220-22.
For earlier versions of this article, see Frances A. Kearns & E.C. Collins, State Defini-
tions of the Gifted and Talented. 1 J. EDUC. GIFTED 44 (1977) and Frances A. Kearns
& Susan F. Koch, State Definitions of the Gifted and Talented: An Update and Analy-
sis, 8 J. EDUc. GIFTED 285 (1985). For purposes of consistency and brevity, unless
otherwise specified, the term "gifted" refers to students who are both "gifted" and
"talented."
13. PAT O'CONNELL Ross, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: A
CASE FOR DEVELOPING AMERICA'S TALENT: PART 2: THE CURRENT STATUS OF ED-
UCATION FOR THE NATION'S MOST TALENTED STUDENTS 2 (1993), available at http://
www.ed.gov/pubs/DevTalent/part2.html [hereinafter NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: PART
21. See also Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students Education Act of 2001, H.R.
490, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(8) (2001) (noting that "in 1990, fewer than 2 cents out of
every $100 spent on elementary and secondary education in the United States was
devoted to providing challenging programming for the Nation's gifted and talented
students").
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gifted students. Part II focuses predominantly on the author's be-
lief that the federal government must protect the educational rights
of gifted students. The author recommends the passage of a bill
enabling systematic protection of the educational rights of gifted
children modeled after the Education for All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act 14 (now the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)).15 Part III reviews the growing body of case law dealing
with rights of gifted children. Part IV discusses various proposals
aimed at providing equitable programming for gifted students.
I. THE EDUCATIONAL NEEDS OF GIFTED STUDENTS
The subject of programming for gifted students is a contentious
issue in America. In an egalitarian nation, where all are considered
equal, 6 critics are reluctant to support special programming for
gifted students because of the fear and suspicion that intellectual-
ism1 7 may lead to elitism. 8 On the other hand, there is the Ameri-
can ideal, most notably reflected in Brown,'9 Title IX,20 and the
14. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (1975) (current version codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1491 (1994)).
15. Education for All Handicapped Children's Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994)); see also STEPHEN B. THOMAS & CHARLES J. Russo,
SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 90's 40-46 (1995) (de-
tailing the poor condition of special education programs prior to the adoption of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act).
16. PAT O'CONNELL Ross, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: A
CASE FOR DEVELOPING AMERICA'S TALENT: PART 1: A CASE FOR DEVELOPING
AMERICA'S TALENT 5 (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: PART 1] (referring
to Alexis de Tocqueville's depiction of the early "United States as a society with low
levels of interest in education and intellect ... that values equality... [and is] uncom-
fortable with social or intellectual distinctions or with hierarchies that they believe
can stand in the way of success for industrious individuals." (quoting ALEXIS DE ToC-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 124 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1840))).
17. NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: PART 1, supra note 16, at 5-6 ("[A]gain and again, it
has been noticed that intellect in America is presented as a kind of excellence, as a
claim to distinction, as a challenge to egalitarianism, as a quality which almost cer-
tainly deprives a man or woman of the common touch." (quoting RICHARD HOF-
STADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 211 (Knopf 1963))).
18. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Programs for the Gifted: To Be or Not to Be, 22 J.
EDuc. GIFTED 3 (1998) (discussing the conflict between egalitarianism and excellence
in the context of gifted education); Mary F. Toll, The Importance of Teacher Prepara-
tion Programs To Appropriately Serve Students Who Are Gifted, UNDERSTANDING
OUR GIFTED, Winter 2000, at 14 (offering examples to counter the notion that classes
for the gifted are elitist).
19. Supra note 4.
20. Supra note 7.
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IDEA,2 a of helping all to succeed and reach their full potential.22
As noted in this Article, this ambivalence is far from resolved.
Regardless of one's attitude toward the subject of giftedness, re-
search indicates that gifted students have unique educational needs
and require special programs.23 In addition, it is important to con-
sider the value of gifted student programs, since many gifted chil-
dren not only fail to succeed on their own, 24 but indeed may
underachieve, 25 experience learning disabilities, 26 and drop out of
school27 because their potential is stifled by the traditional school
curriculum. 28 Moreover, although data is typically not tracked con-
sistently,29 it indicates that gifted children from low income fami-
21. Supra note 15.
22. See, e.g., James R. Delisle, Neither Freaks Nor Geeks: The Gifted Among Us,
EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 27, 1999, at 36, 39 (discussing the new NBC program "Freaks and
Geeks" and pondering whether the sitcom can reverse America's "artificial show of
egalitarianism"); Jonathan A. Plucker, Is Gifted Education Still Viable?, EDUC. WEEK,
March 11, 1998, at 33-34.
23. See Juan A. Alonso, The Differentiated Program: Significant Curriculum Ad-
aptations, 14 GIFTED EDUC. INT'L 80 (1999); see also A NATION AT RISK, supra note
1, at 24 ("[M]ost gifted students ... may need a curriculum enriched and accelerated
beyond the needs of other students of high ability.").
24. See, e.g., Joseph Harrington et al., The Marland Report: Twenty Years Later, 15
J. EDuc. GIFTED 31 (1991); see also Donna Y. Ford & J. John Harris, On Discovering
the Hidden Treasure of Gifted and Talented African-American Children, 13 ROEPER
REV. 27 (1990).
25. See JOANNE RAND WHITMORE, GIFTEDNESS, CONFLICT, AND UNDER-
ACHIEVEMENT (1980); Susan M. Baum, Thomas P. Hebert & Joseph S. Renzulli, Re-
versing Underachievement: Creative Productivity as A Systematic Intervention, GIFTED
CHILD Q., Fall 1995, at 224; Sally M. Reiss & D. Betsy McCoach, The Underachieve-
ment of Gifted Students: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go?, GIFTED CHILD
Q., July 2000, at 152; Sylvia B. Rimm, Why Do Bright Children Underachieve?,
GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 30; Ellen Winner, The Miseducation of
Our Gifted Children, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 16, 1996, at 44-45.
26. See Linda E. Brody & Carol J. Mills, Gifted Children with Learning Disabili-
ties: A Review of the Issues, 30 ROEPER REV. 282 (1997); Scott Norton et al., The
Learning Disabled/ Gifted Student, CONTEMP. EDUC., Fall 1996, at 36.
27. See Joseph S. Renzulli & Sunghee Park, Gifted Dropouts: The Who and The
Why, GIFTED CHILD Q., Oct. 1, 2000, at 261 (2000).
28. Carolyn M. Callahan & J.M. Kaufman, Involving Gifted Children's Parents:
Federal Law is Silent But Its Assumptions Apply, 33 EXCEPTIONAL EDUC. Q. 50
(1982).
29. NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: PART 2, supra note 13, at 2 ("Programs for gifted
and talented students exist in every state and in many school districts, but it is difficult
to determine the exact number of students served because not all states and localities
collect this information."). This report points out that while about 8.8% of all eighth
grade students in public schools participated in programs for the gifted, disparities
abound: "[f]or example, 4 states identify more than ten percent of their students as
gifted and talented, while in 21 states fewer than 5 percent [sic] are identified as
such." Id. at 3.
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lies, 30 minority families, or families living in urban areas31 are in
even greater need of programming than their middle-income peers
because of the greater risk of failure, poor achievement, or
underachievement.32
In response to various reports and commissions calling for edu-
cational excellence, there has been growing,33 albeit far from unan-
imous, 34 support for programs for the gifted. The next section of
this Article reviews the legislative history of programs for gifted
students.
II. LEGISLATION ON GIFTED EDUCATION
A. Federal Legislation
1. Early History
It is well settled that students do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to receive an education 35 absent a constitutional viola-
tion36 or a clear statutory entitlement.37 Even so, Congress has
30. See Paul D. Slocumb & Ruby K. Payne, Identifying and Nurturing the Gifted
Poor, PRINCIPAL, May 2000, at 28 (discussing the needs of gifted students from poorer
backgrounds).
31. See, e.g., Thomas P. Herbeet, Defining Belief in Self: Intelligent Young Men in
an Urban High School, GIFTED CHILD Q., Apr. 2000, at 91 (discussing a case study of
six talented males in an urban high school).
32. See J. John Harris & Donna Y. Ford, Identifying and Nurturing the Promise of
Gifted Black Children, 60 J. NEGRO EDUC. 3 (1991); Donna Y. Ford, Determinants of
Underachievement as Perceived by Gifted, Above-Average, and Average Black Stu-
dents, 14 ROEPER REV. 130 (1992).
33. See, e.g., Joetta L. Stack, Support Building for Renewed Focus On Gifted Edu-
cation, EDUC. WK., Mar. 29, 2001, at 32; National News Roundup, EDUC. WK., Dec. 9,
1992, at 2 (indicating that results of a Gallup poll indicated that 84% of respondents
would favor programs for the gifted as long as they did not reduce funding for other
students and that 61% were of the opinion that schools should do more to challenge
the "very smartest" children). The poll also revealed that 35% of respondents indi-
cated that schools should continue to act as they have with regard to the gifted while
2% were of the opinion that schools should do less for these students. NATIONAL
EXCELLENCE: PART 2, supra note 13, at 2.
34. See, e.g., Lowell C. Rose et al., The 29th Annual Phi Delta Kappan / Gallup
Poll Of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Winter
1997, at 53 (indicating that a narrow majority of respondents favored separate classes
for gifted students).
35. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), a
case involving the constitutionality of a state funding plan in relation to equality of
educational opportunities, the Supreme Court declared that "[elducation, of course, is
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." Id. at 35.
36. If, for example, as in Brown v. Board. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a
party can allege that state action has led to the deprivation of a constitutionally pro-
tected right, such as equal protection, then a lawsuit may proceed in federal court.
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taken a leadership role in safeguarding the educational rights of
minorities, women, and children with disabilities. However, the
history of federal programming for gifted students has been
sporadic.
The earliest federal program on gifted education was created in
1931 when the United States Department of Education instituted a
Section on Exceptional Children and Youth.3 8 Similar to later fed-
eral legislative actions, most notably the Jacob K. Javits Gifted and
Talented Students Act,39 this program lacked specific legislative or
fiscal authority, but laid a foundation for later federal actions re-
garding the gifted.4"
After World War II, with the threat of Soviet aggression and the
spread of communism to China, federal interest in the gifted was
essentially present, although unstated, when Congress enacted the
National Science Foundation Act of 1950.41 This historic act "not
only directed resources toward the development of the sciences
and basic research, but for the first time focused federal attention
on the nation's gifted and talented. '4 2 Previously, Congress di-
rected its attention mostly towards higher education of the gifted in
basic and applied science areas related to the general welfare.43
However, under this act, programs and projects were geared to-
ward improving the curriculum in schools and encouraging gifted
students to seek careers in mathematics and the physical sciences.
Even as federal interest in the gifted was evolving, two research
studies44 revealed a decreased interest in programs for the gifted.
37. For a brief review of major federal statutes on education, see Charles J. Russo,
Know Your Federal Statutes, 67 SCH. Bus. AFFAIRS 46 (2001).
38. Perry A. Zirkel, Paul L. Stevens, The Law Concerning Public Education of
Gifted Students, 34 ED. LAW REP. 353, 353 (1986).
39. See infra notes 90-90 for a discussion of the Javits Act.
40. Jeffrey J. Zettel, The Education of Gifted and Talented Children from a Federal
Perspective, in JOSEPH BALLARD ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: ITS LE-
GAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 51 (1982).
41. National Science Foundation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-507, 64 Stat. 149
(1950) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1871 (1988)).
42. Zettel, supra note 40, at 52.
43. See Derek Bok, What's Wrong with Our Universities, 14 HARV. J.L. &PUB.
POL'Y 305, 306-07 (1991).
44. The first report, a 1948 follow-up on a 1929 survey, found that while nearly
two-thirds of school districts with populations of over 25,000 had some form of ability
grouping, only fifteen reported having special classes for gifted students. The second
report, from Ohio, revealed that only two percent of schools reported providing spe-
cialized services for gifted students. Zettel, supra note 40 at 52-53 (citing ARCH OLI-
VER HECK, THE EDUCATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (1953) and OHIO COMM'N
ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, THE STATUS OF THE GIFTED IN OHIO (1951)).
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This declining interest was exacerbated by anti-intellectualism 45
during the McCarthy era when "intellectuals" were often viewed
with suspicion. For example, discussing President Eisenhower's
1952 defeat of Adlai Stevenson, one commentator noted "an
alarming fact long suspected: there is a wide and unhealthy gap
between the American intellectuals and the people." 46 Not surpris-
ingly, concerns for gifted education was overshadowed by the
much larger debate over school desegregation during the early part
of the 1960s.
2. Equal Educational Opportunities: A Brief,
But Necessary, Excursus
Amid the ebb and flow of support for programs for gifted stu-
dents, the much larger and far-reaching debate over school deseg-
regation came to a head in Brown v. Board of Education47 and its
progeny. 48 Indeed, Brown is the cornerstone of all subsequent le-
gal developments ensuring the rights of disenfranchised groups.
Consequently, reviewing the development of special education is
relevant because, like students with disabilities, gifted students
have individualized needs and should be entitled to some
protection.49
A major impetus in protecting the rights of students with disabil-
ities was provided by Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
45. For further background on this notion of anti-intellectualism, see RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (Knopf 1963).
46. Zettel, supra note 40, at 53 (citing JOEL SPRING, THE SORTING MACHINE-
NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY SINCE 1945 5 (1976)).
47. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. For a review of Supreme Court cases on school desegregation see Charles J.
Russo et al., Brown v. Board of Education at 40: A Legal History of Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities in American Public Education, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 297 (1994).
49. For commentary on the nexus between special education and gifted education,
see Anne Scholtz Heim, Gifted Students and the Right to an Ability-Appropriate Edu-
cation, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 131 (1998); Peggy S. Bittick, Comment, Equality and Excel-
lence: Equal Education Opportunity for Gifted and Talented Children, 36 S. TEX. L.
REV. 119 (1995); Laura Kettermann, Comment, Does the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Exclude Gifted and Talented Children with Emotional Disabilities? An
Analysis of J.D. v. Pawlet, 32 ST. MARY'S L. J. 913 (2001); Renee Vintzel Loridas,
Comment, Equal Educational Opportunity for the Gifted and Talented: Is It Illusory
Without the Right to a Free Appropriate Public Education?, 1980 DET. C. L. REV. 957;
Gewn E. Murray, Note, Special Education for Gifted Children: Answering the "Right"
Question, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 103 (1995); Roseann G. Padula, Notes and Com-
ment, The Plight of Connecticut's Brightest Students: Broadley v. Meriden Board of
Educ., 29 CONN. L. REV. 1319 (1997).
UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
Pennsylvania5" and Mills v. Board of Education.51 Consistent with
the reasoning in Brown, both cases were decided on the basis of
equal protection and due process. Viewed together, these cases
stand for two principles that permeate later developments. First,
children with disabilities have the substantive due process right to
receive a public school education based on their unique, individual
needs. Second, students with disabilities are entitled to the protec-
tion of procedural due process before they can be classified as be-
ing disabled, placed in a non-regular classroom, or transferred to a
new placement.
One year after Mills, Congress enacted Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act.52 This was the first major federal law to offer broad
based protection for otherwise qualified individuals with impair-
ments.53 Although not originally intended to assist students, Sec-
tion 504 has had a profound impact on schools. The law required
that individuals who are otherwise qualified must be permitted to
participate in school programs or activities as long as it is possible
to do so by means of a "reasonable accommodation. 5
4
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, now the IDEA,55 as the most comprehensive federal
law protecting the rights of students who have disabilities. Among
its provisions, the IDEA guarantees all children between the ages
50. 334 Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, F. Supp. 1257
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (recognizing the right to appropriate education for the mentally re-
tarded in the least restrictive environment possible in light of their needs and pre-
scribing due process safeguards prior to their being placed outside the regular
classroom).
51. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that a school
board had an affirmative duty to provide mentally retarded children with publicly
supported education suited to each child's needs, including special education and tui-
tion grants, and a constitutionally adequate prior hearing with periodic review).
52. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as
amended in relevant part at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)) (prohibiting discrimination under
federal grants and programs).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability
in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.").
54. Id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 104.39 (2000) ("A recipient that operates a private
elementary or secondary education program may not, on the basis of handicap, ex-
clude a qualified handicapped person from such program if the person can, with mi-
nor adjustments, be provided with an appropriate education, as defined within [34
C.F.R. §1 104.33(b)(1), within the recipient's program.").
55. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (codified as amended at Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994)). In order to avoid inconsistency, unless
otherwise noted, from this point on, the article uses the acronym IDEA throughout.
20011
736 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
of three and twenty-one 56 with specifically identified disabilities 57 a
"free appropriate public education"58 in the least restrictive envi-
ronment59 in conformance with an Individualized Education Pro-
gram (IEP).6° However, in Board of Education v. Rowley,6' the
first Supreme Court case reviewing the IDEA, the Court held that
the Act "did not impose any greater substantive educational stan-
dard than would be necessary" 62 to provide access to a public edu-
cation for children with disabilities. The Court ruled that the Act
established a floor of educational opportunity below which public
schools could not fall rather than creating an open-ended contin-
uum maximizing available programs.63 Given the Court's reduc-
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i)(ii) (1995).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (1995) offers the following definition:
(3) Child with a disability-
(A) In general
The term "child with a disability" means a child -
(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness),
speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness),
serious emotional disturbance (hereinafter referred to as "emotional distur-
bance"), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other
health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.
(B) Child aged 3 through 9
The term "child with a disability" for a child aged 3 through 9 may, at the
discretion of the State and the local educational agency, include a child-
(i) experiencing developmental delays, as defined by the State and as mea-
sured by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, in one or more
of the following areas: physical development, cognitive development, com-
munication development, social or emotional development, or adaptive de-
velopment; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.
The IDEA makes no references to gifted students.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (8) (2001):
The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and
related services that:
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education pro-
gram required under section 1414(d) of this title.
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(62) (1994).
60. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 (11), 1414 (d) (1995); 34 C.F.R. § 300.340-350 (1999) (pro-
viding additional details on IEPs).
61. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
62. Id. at 192.
63. Although states must adopt policies and procedures that are consistent with
the IDEA, they may provide greater benefits than those required by federal law. Fur-
ther, if a state does establish higher standards, courts will consider them when evalu-
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tionist interpretation of the broadly supported IDEA, it is not
surprising that the rights of gifted students were not assigned a
higher priority.
3. Modern History of Federal Legislation
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched the
world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik. This led to a swift federal
response in the form of the National Defense Education Act of
1958 ("NDEA").6 4 Although the NDEA was not adopted specifi-
cally to address the needs of gifted students, its emphasis on math-
ematics, science, and foreign languages served as a precursor to the
development of programs for the gifted. Furthermore, the Act and
the local response it elicited to it implicitly made gifted students
the prime targets of curricular reforms that were designed to re-
dress underachievement among students who were capable of suc-
cess.6 5 Consequently, as the 1950s came to a close, there was an
increased recognition that since gifted students had the ability to
make significant contributions to the Nation's welfare, especially in
the essential areas of science and technology, it was vital to de-
velop programs to assist them in achieving their full potential.
The promise to the gifted of the late 1950s that might have flow-
ered under President Kennedy's leadership 66 waned under Presi-
dent Johnson's Great Society programs, which emphasized services
for the educationally disadvantaged and economically deprived.
Although the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
("ESEA")6 7 was vital and necessary in looking after the needs of
ating the appropriateness of an IEP. See e.g., David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm'n.,
775 F.2d 411, 420 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that "[where] a state has chosen to provide
by law greater benefits to handicapped children than the Federal law requires, ...
Congress explicitly mandated . . . that both federal and state [courts] determine
whether those standards have been met"); Geis v. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 575, 581 (3d
Cir. 1985) (holding that the Education of the Handicapped Act confers on federal
courts authority to enforce standards of education for handicapped children under
federal question jurisdiction).
64. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580
(codified at scattered sections of 20 & 42 U.S.C. (1994)). Although the gifted were
not the focal point of the Act, Congress indicated that "the Nation had to increase its
efforts to identify and educate more of our talented individuals." Zettel, supra note
40, at 54.
65. See generally JOHN GOODLAD, SCHOOL CURRICULUM REFORM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1964); James J. Gallagher, National Agenda for Educating Gifted
Students: Statement of Priorities, EXCEPTIONAL CHILD., Oct. 1988, at 107.
66. Zettel, supra note 40, at 55.
67. Elementary & Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-750, 80 Stat.
1191, 1204 (codified in part as amended at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. and par-
tially repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 173 (1970)).
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disadvantaged students,68 it may have hindered development of
programs for the gifted. Federal resources that would otherwise
have been earmarked for programs for the gifted were diverted to
other programs under the auspices of the ESEA.69 The federal
government adopted a policy that essentially robbed Peter to pay
Paul by providing resources for one group of deserving students at
the expense of another. Even though the adoption of the ESEA
meant that scant resources were reserved for the gifted, advocates
continued to lobby Congress. Two years later, while some funds
were allocated for innovative and exemplary programs under the
1967 Amendments to the ESEA,7 ° very little was spent on pro-
grams for the gifted.71
The lobbying efforts on behalf of the gifted were rewarded when
versions of a bill were introduced in the Senate and House in Janu-
ary of 1969.72 The bill, proposed as a result of the White House
Task Force on the Gifted and Talented, was initially defeated but
later won passage as The Gifted and Talented Children's Educa-
tion Assistance Act. The Act was passed as Section 806 of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1969,
"Provisions Related to Gifted and Talented Children."73 President
Nixon signed the bill into law on April 13, 1970.74 This law gave
the first federal statutory definition of the term "gifted," called for
the development of model programs, and made programs eligible
68. For a history of this comprehensive statute, see STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH
K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION ADMINISTERS A LAW (1968).
69. Zettel, supra note 40, at 55.
70. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
247, 704, 81 Stat. 783, 817 (1968).
71. See Lynn Pollins, Comment, Legal Rights of Gifted Students: Special Education
at the Other End, 19 CONN. L. REV. 145, 149 (1986) (citing Thomas Pledgie, Has
E.S.E.A. Fostered Innovative and Exemplary Programming for the Gifted?, 20 GIFTED
CHILD Q. 466, 466 (1976)) and noting that although more than 1500 projects were
funded under Title III of the ESEA during the 1975 fiscal year, only 28 were for gifted
students).
72. Zettel, supra note 40, at 55.
73. "The act amended Section 1201 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 by ad-
ding the following definition: The term 'gifted and talented children' means in accor-
dance with objective criteria prescribed by the Commissioner, children who have
outstanding intellectual ability or creative talent, the development of which requires
special activities or services not ordinarily provided by local education agencies." Zet-
tel supra note 40, at 56; The Gifted and Talented Children's Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230,
84 Stat. 121 (1969).
74. Zettel, supra note 40, at 58.
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for federal financial assistance under Titles III and IV of the
ESEA.75
At the outset of the 1970s, the federal government had assumed
a much more active role in providing for the educational needs of
the gifted. On October 6, 1972, Commissioner of Education Sid-
ney Marland submitted his national assessment of programs for the
gifted to Congress. 76 Not surprisingly, the Marland Report urged
Congress to provide ongoing support for the development and
maintenance of programs for gifted students not only because of
their unique needs, but also because the federal government had
virtually no role in this process. 77
Following the impetus of the Marland Report, three similar bills
were introduced in Congress in February of 1973.78 The final bill,
signed into law by President Ford on August 21, 1974, as part of the
1974 Amendments to the ESEA,79 called for federal involvement
in four major areas. First, it created the Office of Gifted and Tal-
ented within the United States Office of Education. Previously, this
Office had been created administratively and was housed in the
United States Bureau of Education for the Handicapped.80 Second,
it called for the creation of a National Clearinghouse for the Gifted
75. Given the role that Senator Jacob Javits of New York played in this and other
laws for the gifted, see Zettel, supra note 40, at 55 (in 1969), 59 (in 1973), 62 (in 1978),
it was only fitting that a subsequent statute was named in his honor.
76. The Marland Report contains a definition of giftedness that has been and con-
tinues to be the one most widely adopted by state and local education agencies:
Gifted and talented children are those identified by professionally qualified
persons who by virtue of outstanding abilities, are capable of high perform-
ance. These are children who require differentiated educational programs
and/or services beyond those normally provided by the regular school pro-
gram in order to realize their contribution to self and society. Children capa-
ble of high performance include those with demonstrated achievement and/
or potential ability in any of the following areas, singly or in combination:
1. general intellectual ability;
2. specific academic aptitude;
3. creative or productive thinking;
4. leadership ability;
5. visual and performing arts;
6. psychomotor ability.
Sidney Marland, Education of the Gifted and Talented: Report to the Congress of the
United States by the U.S. Commissioner of Education 2 (1972).
77. For a follow up on the Marland Report, see Joseph Harrington et al., The
Marland Report: Twenty Years Later, 15 J. EDUC. GIFrED 31 (1991).
78. Zettel, supra note 40, at 59.
79. ESEA Amendments of 1974, Part IV, § 404, Pub. L. 93-80, 88 Stat. 503 (codi-
fied at 20 U.S.C. § 1863 (1976) (repealed 1978).
80. See Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-247, 704, 81 Stat. 783, 817 (1968).
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and Talented. Third, the Act made funds available to state and lo-
cal education agencies along with grants for training, research, and
projects for the gifted. Fourth, the Act authorized an annual fed-
eral appropriation not to exceed $12.5 million for programs on the
gifted.81 Insofar as the original draft of the bill called for an annual
federal authorization of $80 million for programs for the gifted 8 2 it
is not surprising that advocates were disappointed since this
amounted to about one dollar a year for each eligible student.8 3
An era of ongoing progress appeared to be on the horizon when
the Gifted and Talented Children's Education Act of 197884 be-
came law. This act extended the funding provisions of the Special
Projects Act. Unlike the IDEA, which was designed to place chil-
dren with disabilities in fully inclusive educational settings, the
Gifted and Talented Children's Act was intended to provide sepa-
rate programs for gifted students.85 The Gifted and Talented Chil-
dren's Education Act provided financial assistance to states to
plan, develop, operate, and improve programs for gifted students
and allowed the United States Commissioner to provide discretion-
ary funding for such programs.86
The promise of the Gifted and Talented Children's Education
Act of 1978 was short-lived since it was repealed in 1981 when
President Reagan signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
("OBRA"). 87 OBRA also closed the Office of Gifted and Tal-
ented, eliminated categorical funding from federal sources, and
combined authorizations for gifted education and twenty-one other
programs into a single block grant while reducing funding by more
than forty percent. 88 As a result, the federal government com-
pletely suspended its direct involvement in programs for gifted stu-
dents during much of the 1980s.
Amid concerns of "a rising tide of mediocrity,"8 9 education re-
form swept the Nation in the early 1990s. The passage of the Jacob
81. Zettel, supra note 40, at 61.
82. Id.
83. FRANCES A. KARNES & RONALD G. MARQUARDT, GIFTED CHILDREN AND
THE LAW 8 (1991).
84. Gifted and Talented Children's Education Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561,
Title IX-A, 92 Stat. 2143, 2292 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3311-3318 (1978)) (repealed
1982).
85. H.R. REP. No. 95-1137, at 76 (1978).
86. Zettel, supra note 40, at 61-3.
87. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 2175, 95 Stat.
357, 809 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (1994)).
88. Zettel, supra note 40, at 83-84.
89. A NATION AT RISK, supra note 1, at 5.
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K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students Act of 1994 marked the cul-
mination of the efforts of supporters of gifted education.90 This
Act, which incorporated many of the recommendations of the Mar-
land Report, reinstated, expanded, and updated earlier programs
while offering priority funding for programs to serve gifted stu-
dents who are economically disadvantaged, speak limited English,
or have disabilities. 91
As significant as the Javits Act is, it has three major shortcom-
ings. First, although the Act provides some modest resources ,92 it
does not offer enough assistance to help create widespread pro-
grams. Second, the Act does not mandate the creation of programs
for gifted students. Third, the Act does not include substantive or
procedural due process safeguards similar to those available to stu-
dents with disabilities under the IDEA. Consequently, its good in-
tentions aside, the Javits Act can virtually be ignored by states that
do not place a priority on programs for gifted children.
Most recently, The Gifted and Talented Education Act of 2001
was introduced in both houses of Congress 93 and sent to Commit-
tee.94 This Act proposes to assist state educational agencies to de-
velop or expand programs for gifted students. These programs can
take the form of professional development programs, technical as-
sistance, innovative programs and services, or emerging technolo-
90. Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 89-10
(1965), as added Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3820 (current version at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 8031-37). The Javits Act was designed "to provide financial assistance to State and
local educational agencies ... to initiate a coordinated program of research ... de-
signed to build a nationwide capability in elementary and secondary schools to meet
the special educational needs of gifted and talented students." 20 U.S.C. § 8032 (b)(1).
According to the Act,
The term "gifted and talented," when used with respect to students, children
and youth . . . who give evidence of high performance capability in areas
such as intellectual, creative, artistic, or leadership capacity, or in specific
academic fields and who require services or activities not ordinarily provided
by the school in order to fully develop such capabilities.
20 U.S.C. § 8801 (16) (1994). Unlike earlier versions, the Act not only eliminated
specific references to preschool, elementary and/or secondary education, but also ex-
cluded any reference to performing arts.
91. 20 U.S.C. § 8035(a)(1) (1994) (setting the Act's priorities).
92. For example, in 1992 the Javits Act provided just under $10 million to support
programs. NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: PART 2, supra note 13, at 3. More recently, in
2001, the Javits Act only provided $7.5 million for research grants. Lisa Fine, Advo-
cates Say Bill Leaves Gifted Students Behind, EDUC. WK., June 13, 2001, at 21, 23.
93. H.R. 490, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 421, 107th Cong. (2001).
94. The House version was referred to the House Committee on Education and
the Workforce, H.R. 490, 107th Cong. (2001), while the Senate version was sent to the
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 147 Cong. Rec. S1746
(2001).
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gies.9" Amid controversy and politics,96 versions of the Act were
ultimately approved in the House,97 but the bill faces an uncertain
future in Senate Committee.98
Regardless of whether Congress adopts a new version of the Ja-
vits Act, it is clear that since gifted students have special needs,
only states can provide appropriate programs.99 Yet, as reflected in
the next section of this Part, inconsistencies in state responses ne-
cessitate a federal legislative response.
B. State Action
Information on state programs for the gifted is elusive since state
laws and regulations defy accurate, fully up-to-date compilation. 100
With this caveat in mind, this brief review examines state defini-
tions of the term "gifted," the degree to which state programs are
mandated and funded, and the requirements regulating educators
of the gifted.
The most recent study reported that forty-five states categorize
gifted students under a variety of rubrics such as "gifted," "gifted
and talented," "learner of high ability," "highly capable students,"
and "exceptional student." Five states have no definitions or cate-
95. For a discussion of this bill see Fine, supra note 90 at 21, 23. See also Kristen
B. Stephens, Gifted Education and the Law, GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2001, at
30, 31-32 (2001).
96. Although both the House and Senate adopted versions of the Javits Act, it
may still face an uncertain future in the Senate and in forthcoming conference com-
mittee meetings designed to reconcile both versions. Supporters fear that the Javits
Act seems to have little chance of surviving since it was not originally contained in
President Bush's proposed education plan contained in the House version and was
reinstated late in the process. Moreover, the chair of the House Education and
Workfare Committee, Rep. John Boehner, R-Ohio, is not opposed to a consolidation
of the Javits Act, even though he was responsible for the version of the bill that kept
the Act. Lisa Fine, Advocates Say Bill Leaves Gifted Students Behind, EDUC. WEEK,
June 13, 2001, at 21, 23. See also Joetta L. Sack, Advocates Unite to Block Bush Con-
solidation Plan, EDUC. WEEK, May 2, 2001, at 26, 30 (including a discussion of efforts
to save Javits grants for the gifted).
97. H.R. 490, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Lisa Fine, ESEA Minus Vouchers, Eas-
ily Passes House, EDUC. WEEK, May 30, 2001, at 24, 26.
98. See Lynn Olson & Erik W. Robelen, ESEA Passage Unlikely Before Fall,
EDUC. WEEK, July 11, 2001, at 1, 38-39.
99. FRANCES A. KARNES & RONALD G. MARQUARDT, GIFTED CHILDREN AND
LEGAL ISSUES 4 (2000).
100. E.g., Mary S. Lamdrum et al., A National Survey of Current Legislation and
Policy Trends in Gifted Education: Life After the National Excellence Report, 21 J.
EDUC. GIFTED 352 (1998) (offering data from the forty-two states that responded to
the survey instrument); Kristen F. Stephens & Frances A. Kearns, State Definitionsfor the Gifted and Talented Revisited, EXCEPTIONAL CHILD., Jan. 1, 2000, at 219 (pro-
viding a comprehensive review of all states).
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gories of gifted students.10 1 Presently, at least thirty-one states
mandate programs for gifted students. °2 At least twelve of these
states mandate programs under their own education laws. Other
states deal with this issue separately. 103
Twenty-nine states reported that they provided various levels of
support funding while another thirteen'0 4 did not provide any fi-
nancial support. 0 5 Even among those states providing support,
tremendous levels of disparity exist. Texas, for example, reported
spending $56 million on gifted education while Massachusetts only
reported spending $437,970.106
At least twenty-eight states require certification for individuals
who teach in programs for the gifted while an additional three pro-
vide it as an option. 0 7 The remaining twenty-two states reported
that they had no specific certification requirements for working
with gifted students. 0 8
11. LITIGATION INVOLVING GIFrED STUDENTS
Litigation concerning gifted children is increasing rapidly. 0 9
However, courts are still reluctant to grant gifted students addi-
tional rights absent statutory mandates.1 10 Before reviewing the
101. Stephens & Kearns, supra note 100, at 236. Only Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Dakota did not have definitions for gifted.
Id. at 222.
102. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 66 tbl. 55 (2000) (reviewing state legislation on gifted and talented pro-
grams and number and percent of students receiving services in public elementary
and secondary schools in 1993-94 and 1995-96); see also Lamdrum et. al., supra note
100, at 355 (reporting that of the thirty-three states that reported having legislation on
the gifted, seventeen mandated programming).
103. Lamdrum, et. al., supra note 100, at 355.
104. Id. Ohio, however, only mandates the identification of gifted students and
does not provide funding for programs. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3324.10-3324.07,
3324.04 (West 1994) (providing for identification of gifted students).
105. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 102, at 66 (indicating that as of July 1997,
sixteen states had provided discretionary state-supported programs).
106. Fine, supra note 100, at 21.
107. Frances A. Karnes et al., Certification and Specialized Competencies for Teach-
ers in Gifted Education Programs, 22 ROPER REV. 201 (2000). See also Frances A.
Karnes & James E. Whorton, Teacher Certification and Endorsement in Gifted Educa-
tion: A Critical Need, 19 ROPER REV. 54, 54 (1996); see also Landrum et al., supra
note 100, at 356 (reporting that twenty states had certification requirements).
108. Karnes et al., supra note 107, at 202.
109. Perry A. Zirkel & Paul L. Stevens, The Law Concerning Public Education of
Gifted Students, 34 EDuc. L. REP. 353, 366 (1986).
110. But see Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 503 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986), affd, 539 A.2d 785 (Pa. 1988) (upholding the Education Secretary's deter-
mination that student was entitled to individualized educational program, apart from
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case law pertinent ,to gifted students, it is worth reiterating that elit-
ism is a concern often raised in connection with gifted education,"'
which appears to exclude other children, suggesting tracking or
ability grouping. 1 2 Tracking is the practice of examining school
children at a young age, typically by IQ tests, and than assigning
them to curricular "tracks," frequently to the detriment of poor
and minority students. 13 This article does not review the litigation
on tracking1 4 because states have typically avoided challenges to
their gifted programs on the basis that they have learned their les-
sons and have adopted expansive definitions of giftedness that em-
ploy multiple criteria for inclusion in programs." 5
This section of the article reviews the case law involving gifted
students.'1 6 This section discusses cases focused on admissions and
placement, transportation, federal claims, and race.
enrollment in district's approved enrichment program); Woodland Hills High Sch.
Dist. v. Commonwealth, 516 A.2d 875 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (ruling that gifted stu-
dents had a right to transportation to their programs).
111. For discussions of these criticisms, see Abraham J. Tannenbaum, Programs for
the Gifted: To Be or Not to Be, 22 J. FOR THE EDUC. OF THE GIFTED 3 (1998) and
Mary F. Toll, The Importance of Teacher Preparation Programs To Appropriately
Serve Students Who Are Gifted, UNDERSTANDING OUR GiFTED, Winter 2000, at 1.
112. The leading case challenging tracking is Hobson v. Hansen. Hobson v. Han-
sen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding that defendants' policies denied equal opportunity to stu-
dents and requiring the school board to end ability tracking, provide bus transporta-
tion for desegregation, integrate teacher assignments, and abolish optional attendance
zones).
113. See, e.g., Simmons v. Hooks, 843 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (holding that
school district's use of ability grouping violated children's constitutional rights).
114. For recent commentaries on tracking, see Angelia Dickens, Revisiting Brown
v. Board of Education: How Tracking Has Resegregated America's Public Schools, 29
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 469 (1996) and Daniel J. Losen, Note, Silent Segregation
in Our Nation's Schools, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517 (1999).
115. See Stephens & Kearns, supra note 100, at 219.
116. Even though this article focuses on the rights of gifted students, it is worth
noting that teachers in gifted programs have engaged in litigation to protect their
rights. See, e.g., Dilley v. Slippery Rock Area Sch. Dist., 625 A.2d 153 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1993) (upholding the RIF of a staff member with greater seniority where the
school board demonstrated the need to retain a gifted teacher with less seniority);
Egan v. Bd. of Educ., 406 S.E.2d 733 (W. Va. 1991) (directing a school board to hire a
teacher with certification in gifted education to replace a faculty member who lacked
certification in this area); Dallap v. Sharon City Sch. Dist., 571 A.2d 368 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1990) (reversing a board's decision to retain the coordinator of a gifted program
while subjecting teachers with greater seniority to a RIF); Rosen v. Montgomery
County Intermediate Unit No. 23, 495 A.2d 217 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (permitting
RIFs of teachers in a program for gifted students); Degener v. Governing Bd., 136
Cal. Rptr. 801 (1977) (upholding a reduction in force (RIF) where one of the employ-
ees was a teacher in a program for the gifted).
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A. Admissions and Placement
Absent an express statutory or regulatory mandate, when a
school board employs a rational method of selection, such as a lot-
tery, that gives all qualified children an equal opportunity to enter
a program with a limited number of openings 17 or a program re-
stricted to students of a certain age,118 courts have generally
adopted an all or nothing approach to the extent that a student is
either admitted or excluded from gifted education.
The earliest case on admission to a program for gifted students
was Ackerman v. Rubin."9 In Ackerman, a state appellate court
affirmed that the New York City Board of Education did not act
improperly in denying a student admission to a special progress
class that accelerated the regular three-year junior high school cur-
riculum into two years. The court reasoned that in light of a board
directive that admissions decisions had to be based on factors be-
yond academics, such as students' emotional, social, and physiolog-
ical development and maturity, educators did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in finding that the child was not qualified because he
failed to reach the appropriate age cut-off.1 20 Interestingly enough,
in the context of this discussion, the trial court acknowledged that
"[i]t appears that the Board of Education initiated special progress
classes more than forty years ago. 121
In Central York School District v. Commonwealth,22 an appel-
late court rejected a school board's argument that it did not have to
provide a placement for a gifted student since doing so was contin-
117. Bennett v. City Sch. Dist., 114 A.D.2d 58 (App. Div. 1985) (affirming, inter
alia, that a gifted child was not entitled to admission to a full-time program for gifted
students where school officials employed a lottery for selecting a limited number of
applicants from a pool of qualified students; the student was one of 112 applicants for
27 openings in the program).
118. Zweifel v. Joint Dist., 251 N.W.2d 822 (Wis. 1977) (affirming that the state
constitution did not require a school board to grant early admission to a bright four-
year old). Although regarding it irrelevant, the dissent noted that one of the reasons
why the board refused to admit the child was that it did not have special programs for
gifted students. Id. at 828. See also Wright v. Ector County Indep. Sch. Dist., 867
S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App. 1994) (affirming that since a Texas law requiring school boards
to create programs for gifted students required a child to be six years old in order to
be enrolled in a first grade gifted program, a five year-old gifted student did not have
a right to enter first grade).
119. Ackerman v. Rubin, 231 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1962), affid, 232 N.Y.S.2d 872
(App. Div. 1962) (mem.).
120. Ackerman v. Rubin, 231 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (noting that the
student was going to be 10.7 rather than the required 11.3 years of age at the start of
the school year in Sept. 1962).
121. Id.
122. Ctr. York Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 399 A.2d 167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
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gent on receiving state funding.'23 The court responded that be-
cause state funding was not a condition precedent to providing the
child with an educational program, the child was entitled to an ap-
propriate placement.
Pennsylvania has had more litigation than any other state with
regard to the rights of gifted students124 and has the most signifi-
cant case safeguarding the statutory rights of these children. In
Centennial School District v. Commonwealth,a25 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania unanimously affirmed that, pursuant to a
Commonwealth statute 126 and regulations127 requiring an IEP128
123. For a similar state case unsuccessfully challenging special education as an un-
funded mandate, see City of Worcester v. Governor, 625 N.E.2d 1337 (Mass. 1994).
124. For a discussion of administrative determinations in Pennsylvania as well as a
general review of case law, see Perry A. Zirkel & Paul L. Stevens, The Law Concern-
ing Public Education of Gifted Students, 34 EDuc. L. REP. 353 (1986).
125. Centennial School District v. Commonwealth, 503 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986), affd, 539 A.2d 785 (Pa. 1988) (upholding the statute and regulation by a six-to-
zero margin as one of its members did not participate in the case). For a discussion of
Centennial, see Ronald G. Marquardt & Frances A. Karnes, The Courts and Gifted
Education, 50 EDUc. L. REP. 9 (1989).
126. 22 PA. CONS. STAT. CODE § 13.1 (1994). In its most relevant part, the statute
which "requires special treatment for exceptional students" read
(1) Standards for Proper Education and Training of Exceptional Children.
The State Board of Education shall adopt and prescribe standards and regu-
lations for the proper education and training of all exceptional children by
school districts or counties singly or jointly ....
(2) Plans for Education and Training Exceptional Children. Each inter-
mediate unit, cooperatively with other intermediate units and with school
districts shall prepare and submit to the Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion, on or before the first day of August ... for his approval or disapproval,
plans for the proper education and training of all exceptional children in
accordance with the standards and regulations adopted by the State Board
of Education. Plans as provided for in this section shall be subject to revision
from time to time as conditions warrant, subject to the approval of the Su-
perintendent of Public Instruction.
Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 503 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (cit-
ing 22 PA. CONS. STAT. CODE § 13.1(ii)), affd, 539 A.2d 785, 788 (Pa. 1988).
127. In their most relevant parts, the regulations read:
22 [Pa.Code] § 341.1. Definitions.
(iv) Mentally gifted.-Outstanding intellectual and creative ability the de-
velopment of which requires special activities or services not ordinarily pro-
vided in the regular program. Persons shall be assigned to a program for the
gifted when they have an IQ of 130 or higher. A limited number of persons
with IQ scores lower than 130 may be admitted to gifted programs when
other educational criteria in the profile of the person strongly indicate gifted
ability.
22 [Pa.Code] § 341.15. Individualized Education Program.
The Individualized Education Program for each person assigned to special
education programs or services shall include:
(1) A statement of the present level of educational performance of the
person.
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for each gifted student, a child had a right to gifted education. The
court reasoned that a school board's provision of a 150 minute-a-
week pull-out program was insufficient for a gifted child because
the enrichment program did not address his need for accelerated
instruction in reading and mathematics. 129 However, similar to
Rowley, 130 where the Supreme Court ruled that the IDEA provides
a floor of opportunity, the court held that "instruction to be of-
fered need not 'maximize' the student's ability to benefit from an
individualized education program ' 131 as long as what a school
board makes available is appropriate to a child's needs. 32 Follow-
(2) A statement of annual goals which describes the expected behaviors
to be achieved through the implementation of the Individualized Education
Program of the person.
(3) A statement of short-term instructional objectives.
(4) A statement of specific educational services to be provided to the
child, including a description of special education and related services re-
quired to meet the unique needs of the child, a special instructional media
and materials to be provided, and the type of physical education program in
which the child will participate.
(5) A description of the extent to which the child will be able to partici-
pate in regular education programs.
(6) The projected date for initiation and the anticipated duration of
services.
(7) Appropriate objective criteria, evaluation procedures and schedules
for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether the instructional objec-
tives are being achieved.
22 PA. CODE § 341 (1994).
128. This is virtually identical to the requirement under federal law that an IEP be
developed for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 (11) (1994), 1414 (d); 34
C.F.R. § 300.340-350 (2000).
129. Between the intermediate and appellate decisions in Centennial, in Scott. S. v.
Commonwealth, 512 A.2d 790 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), an appellate court affirmed
that a gifted student with a state-mandated IEP was not entitled to his parents' prefer-
ence for further instruction in mathematics after he completed the district's final and
most advanced course.
130. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
131. Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 539 A.2d 785, 791 (Pa. 1988), affg
503 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
132. See also Gateway Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Educ., 559 A.2d
118 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (relying on Centennial in disallowing the school district's
appeal and holding that the district had waived the issue of whether it should be
required to develop an IEP that included the student's college courses).
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ing Centennial,13 3 not all cases134 in Pennsylvania have been re-
solved in favor of gifted students. 1
35
Broadley v. Board of Education is more typical of the states'
treatment of gifted children. 136 In Broadley, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut unanimously affirmed that a gifted child's state consti-
tutional right to a free public education did not include the right to
special education. 137 The court also decided that the legislature's
failure to mandate a program for a gifted child did not violate
rights under the equal rights and equal protection provisions of the
state constitution.1 38
B. Transportation
Absent transportation, a child, gifted or otherwise, may be una-
ble to participate in any educational program. This section reviews
cases where the controversy was whether gifted children were enti-
tled to transportation to special programs. 139 All three of the main
133. For a discussion of Centennial's subsequent application, see Ronald G. Mar-
quardt & Frances A. Karnes, The Courts and Gifted Education Revisited, 113 EDUC.
L. REP. 539 (1996).
134. See Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Commonwealth., 547 A.2d 520 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988) (directing a school board to provide tuition and transportation to a learning
center for a gifted student with a hearing impairment); Conrad Weisner Area Sch.
Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 603 A.2d 701 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (affirming that the suc-
cess of a student identified as mentally gifted in regular education did not preclude his
classification as an exceptional child with a specific learning disability who was enti-
tled to special education).
135. See, e.g., New Brighton Area Sch. Dist. v. Matthew Z., 697 A.2d 1056 (Pa.
Commw. Ct 1997) (denying a gifted student's request for tuition reimbursement and
transportation costs in connection with his taking college courses not listed in his IEP
where the school provided an appropriate placement); Huldah A. by Anderson v.
Easton Area Sch. Dist., 601 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (affirming that the par-
ent of a gifted child who was maintained in a "pull-out" program rather than being
placed in an enrichment class that was open to gifted and non-gifted students pending
completion of her state-mandated IEP was not entitled to attorney fees and costs
since the student failed to comply with the IDEA's definition of disabled).
136. Broadley v. Bd. of Educ., 639 A.2d 502 (Conn. 1994).
137. Broadley, 639 A.2d at 505.
138. Id. at 507. See generally, Gewn E. Murray, Note, Special Education for Gifted
Children: Answering the Right Question, 15 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 103 (1995); Roseann
G. Padula, Notes and Comment, The plight of Connecticut's Brightest Students:
Broadley v. Meriden Board of Educ., 29 CONN. L. REV. 1319 (1997).
139. For a case peripherally involving gifted education and transportation, see
O'Campo v. School Bd., 589 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). O'Campo reversed
a grant of summary judgment that had been entered in favor of a school board where
a student who was waiting in front of her school at 6.55 A.M. to be transported to a
special arts program for gifted children was raped. The court noted that school offi-
cials had been notified that suspicious persons had been observed on school grounds
prior to the rape.
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cases involved students in non-public schools, although the type of
school attended was not dispositive in any of the cases.
The earliest case on transportation was Sands Point Academy v.
Board of Education4 ° in which a trial court ruled that a school
board did not have to provide bus transportation for children at-
tending a non-public school that was "universally recognized as
one of the most important centers for the education of gifted chil-
dren."'' As a prelude to its holding, the court observed that the
board had never deviated from its twenty-eight-year-old policy
which set a five mile limit for all school bus routes (other than
those for children with disabilities), 42 including those for schools
outside of the New York City limits. The court concluded that
since the school was located 8.69 miles from the New York City
line in neighboring Nassau County, the board properly exercised
its discretion in refusing to provide bus transportation for these
gifted students. 143
In the first of two cases from Pennsylvania, Woodland Hills High
School District v. Commonwealth,44 a state court safeguarded the
rights of gifted children.1 45 The court granted the state department
of education's request for summary judgment in a dispute over
whether eligible children who attended non-public schools had a
right to midday transportation to public schools so that they could
attend, and participate in, programs for the gifted. In rejecting the
local board's argument that it was only obligated to transport
gifted students under the state's general transportation statute, the
court essentially reasoned that the right to gifted education was
meaningless without transportation to the midday programs. The
court concluded that parental decisions "to have their children at-
tend a nonpublic school and to be dually enrolled in the District's
gifted program should not impose on them the choice between a
duty to provide midday transportation or in the alternative forego
their children's right to gifted special education.' 46
140. Sands Point Acad. v. Bd. of Educ., 311 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
141. Id. at 590.
142. The court pointed out that "[a] different rule pertains to the transportation of
the physically handicapped, emotionally disturbed or children with retarded mental
development." Id.
143. Id. at 591.
144. Woodland Hills High Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth, 516 A.2d 875 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986).
145. See also Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth., 547 A.2d 520 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)
(directing a school board to provide tuition and transportation to a learning center for
a gifted student with a hearing impairment).
146. Woodland Hills, 516 A.2d at 878.
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Conversely, in Ellis v. Chester Upland School District,147 an ap-
pellate court in Pennsylvania affirmed a hearing officer's denial of
a parent's request for transportation and tuition reimbursement so
that her daughter could attend a private, out-of-state program for
gifted students. 48 The court was satisfied that since the IEP devel
oped by school personnel was appropriate to meet the child's edu-
cational needs, there was no reason to disturb the hearing officer's
determination. In the alternative, the court explained that state
law did not entitle a gifted student to placement in a private or out-
of-state school. 149
C. Federal Claims
Insofar as it can be argued that gifted students and children with
disabilities tend to reflect disparate points on a continuum of ex-
ceptionality, advocates of the gifted had hoped that the IDEA and
federal claims would have offered support in their quest to obtain
programming for gifted students. However, this has typically not
been the case.
Apparently the earliest reported case alleging a violation of a
student's "constitutional and statutory 'rights to a decent educa-
tion"' was Johnpoll v. Elias'50 in which a father sought an injunc-
tion permitting his gifted son to enroll in the high school of his
choice. A federal trial court in New York City rejected the father's
claim on the basis that he failed to raise serious questions on the
merits and was unable to demonstrate how his son would have suf-
fered irreparable harm had he not been admitted to the school.
Further, while the father neither adequately clarified the nature of
his constitutional claim as, for example, equal protection or due
process or whether the alleged violations were of state or federal
rights, the court examined these issues in disposing of the claim.
The court also rejected the father's claim that his son was covered
by the IDEA. 5
147. Ellis v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 651 A.2d 616 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
148. See also New Brighton Area Sch. Dist. v. Matthew Z., 697 A.2d 1056 (Pa.
Commw. Ct 1997) (denying a gifted student's request for transportation (and tuition
reimbursement) costs in connection with his taking college courses not listed in his
IEP where the school provided an appropriate placement).
149. Ellis, 651 A.2d at 619-20. Further, the court rejected the parent's request for
attorney fees. Id. at 620.
150. Plaintiff's Memo of Law at 1, Johnpoll v. Elias, 513 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.N.Y.
1980).
151. Id. at 432.
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At issue in Student Roe v. Commonwealth152 was whether a local
school board's refusal to place a child in a program for gifted stu-
dents violated the child's rights to equal protection or due pro-
cess.1 53  The plaintiff unsuccessfully claimed that the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania violated her federal constitutional
and statutory rights under the IDEA, but the court found that the
dispute was "solely a matter of state law." '154 The court declared
that school officials did not violate the student's rights since she did
"not have a property interest in being placed in gifted educa-
tion" 155 or a liberty interest insofar that she failed "to identify any
information or ideas which she has been precluded from
receiving.' '1 56
In Hope v. Cortines,57 the Second Circuit affirmed a district
court's refusal to grant relief to a gifted student in New York with
dyslexia who filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.1 58 The student claimed that a local school board unlawfully
engaged in discrimination on the basis of disability and race by re-
fusing to provide him with appropriate educational services. 159 The
court was satisfied that the student's claim was without merit be-
152. Student Roe v. Commonwealth, 638 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Pa. 1986), affd 813
F.2d 398 tbl. (3d Cir. 1987).
153. See also Student Roe v. Commonwealth, 593 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (dis-
missing a claim for injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of the procedures
by which a student was denied participation in a class for gifted students on the basis
that her rights to equal protection were not violated and that she could not claim a
violation of procedural due process since she did not avail herself of available state
remedies); Lisa H. v. State Bd. of Educ., 447 A.2d 669 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982), aff'd
467 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 1983) (mem.) (holding that while all students in Pennsylvania have
a property interest in the educational process, only exceptional children have a right
to an individualized level or quality of education).
154. Student Roe, 638 F. Supp. at 929, 931.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 932.
157. Hope v. Cortines, 69 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 1995), affg Hope v. Cortines, 872 F.
Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
158. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), was
adopted in 1990 to provide "a comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Al-
though the Americans with Disabilities Act applies primarily to the private sector, it
has implications for public entities such as schools.
159. The IDEA and accompanying regulations contain extensive procedural due
process requirements, including the requirement that an aggrieved party exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before filing suit. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(g), 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500-
300.517.
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cause he failed to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the
IDEA.160
In a case initially resolved prior to the enactment of the 1997
Amendments to the IDEA, the Tenth Circuit, in Fowler v. Unified
School District,161 ruled that a school board in Kansas was not re-
quired to provide an on-site sign language interpreter for a gifted
student who attended a private non-sectarian school if doing so
cost more than delivering a similar service at a public school. On
remand, in a case that only peripherally involved the child's being
gifted and which is of much greater significance for special educa-
tion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that since the 1997 IDEA Amend-
ments were not applicable retroactively, the court's original
judgment stood with respect to events that took place before the
Amendments went into effect on June 4, 1997.162 Conversely, as to
actions after June 4, 1997, the court explained that the school
board's sole obligation was to spend a proportionate amount of
federal funds on students in non-public schools.
J.D. v. Pawlet School District163 was a lawsuit filed on behalf of a
gifted student in Vermont with emotional and behavioral problems
who unsuccessfully alleged that his school board refused to place
him in special education because his parents and educators could
not agree on whether his disability affected his school perform-
ance. The suit also claimed that school officials failed to accommo-
date the student's needs by not reimbursing his parents for tuition
and costs at an out-of-state residential school. The Second Circuit
affirmed that insofar as the student was ineligible for special educa-
tion under the IDEA, he was not entitled to its procedural protec-
tions.1 64 In addition, the court affirmed that the school board's
proposed IEP (offering the student access to programming such as
college-level courses at a nearby college) was more appropriate to
160. See also Huldah A. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 601 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991) (affirming that the parent of a gifted child was not entitled to attorney fees
where the child was kept in a "pull-out" program rather than being placed in an en-
richment class open to gifted and non-gifted students pending completion of her state-
mandated IEP costs because the student failed to comply with the IDEA's definition
of disabled).
161. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F.3d 797 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated and re-
manded, 521 U.S. 1115 (1997) (mem.).
162. Fowler v. United Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1997) (on remand).
163. J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000). For a discussion of this
case, see Laura Kettermann, Comment, Does the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act Exclude Gifted and Talented Children with Emotional Disabilities? An Analy-
sis of J.D. v. Pawlet, 32 ST. MARY'S L. J. 913 (2001).
164. 224 F.3d at 60.
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his needs and thus a reasonable accommodation within the param-
eters of Section 594 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court conceded
that while the accommodations were not "optimal," the school
board was only required to provide the student with "the same ac-
cess to the benefits of a public school education as all other stu-
dents,' 65 and therefore did not grant relief.166
D. Race
All three of the cases directly implicating race and gifted educa-
tion could arguable have been placed under the heading of "Ad-
missions and Placement." However, these cases are examined
under their own heading in order to emphasize the still unfulfilled
promise of Brown v. Board of Education.67
In Board of Education v. Sanders, a local school board in Illinois
challenged the state board of education's withholding of funding
from the local board's program for gifted students on grounds that
since minority students were under-represented in the programs,
then the programs must be being operated in a discriminatory fash-
ion.' 68 An appellate court affirmed that since neither the state
board's general supervisory authority over the gifted program nor
federal anti-discrimination policy authorized it to withhold funding
based on its unilateral determination that the local board engaged
in racial discrimination, it had to provide the funding. 169
In Simmons ex reL Simmons v. Hooks,170 an African-American
mother claimed that a school board violated her children's rights
through its use of ability grouping. 171 In Reviewing the board's
policies on ability grouping at various times, a federal trial court
court concluded that the "old policy of ability grouping and the
new policy, in so far as it groups by ability entire classes of children
in kindergarten through third grade." had violated the student's
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 72 However, in turning to gifted
education specifically, the court found that while the board's past
165. Id. at 71.
166. See also Punxsutawney Area Sch. Dist. v. Kanouff, 663 A.2d 831 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1995) (holding, in a case only incidentally involving a child's being gifted, that a
school board failed to provide an appropriate place for her, and another child, after
officials were notified of their potentially disabling conditions).
167. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
168. Bd. of Educ. v. Sanders, 502 N.E.2d 730 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986), appeal denied, 508
N.E.2d 208 (111 1987).
169. Id.
170. Simmons v. Hooks, 843 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
171. Id. at 1298.
172. Id. at 1303.
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actions had a segregative effect on students, there was no evidence
that it continued to engage in intentional discrimination with re-
gard to admitting students into its gifted programs. 173 The court
concluded that since the board has taken active steps to overcome
the past effects of segregation in identifying minority students and
increasing their participation in gifted programs, it no longer oper-
ated to continue results of past discrimination. 174
Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators,175 an extension of the
long-running school desegregation litigation in Denver, Colo-
rado, 76 was a complex case with gifted education being only one
component. Employing a rationale not unlike the one in Simmons,
the federal trial court acknowledged that the current disparities
with regard to the low level of "participation [of minority students]
in gifted and talented programs may be remaining vestiges of the
dual system.' 77 Even so, the court refused to grant relief in light
of Missouri v. Jenkins,78 the most recent Supreme Court case on
school desegregation, since Jenkins "defeats the plaintiffs' call for
compelling additional action to investigate and redress racial dis-
parities in student achievements [sic] and participation in special
programs for gifted and talented pupils."'1 79 More specifically, the
court was convinced that although disparities remained with regard
to gifted students' programming, since school officials had adopted
reasonable, if not entirely successful, steps to equalize participation
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo. 1995).
176. Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (holding that since the school board's
actions gave rise to a prima facie case of intentional segregation, the burden of proof
shifted to it to prove that other segregated schools in the district were not created
deliberately). In Keyes, for the first time, the Court ruled that another minority group,
Mexican-Americans, should be placed in the same category as African-Americans be-
cause both groups suffered from the same educational inequities.
177. Keyes, 902 F. Supp. at 1282 (D. Colo. 1995).
178. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that a determination as to
whether students in district are at or below national norms was not appropriate test to
determine whether previously segregated district has achieved partially unitary sta-
tus). For a discussion of this case, see Charles J. Russo & Lawrence F. Rossow, Mis-
souri v. Jenkins Redux: The End of the Road for School Desegregation Or Another
Stop on an Endless Journey? 103 EDuc. L. REP. 1 (1995). For a discussion of later
developments in this dispute, see Floyd G. Delon & Charles J. Russo, The Implemen-
tation of Missouri v. Jenkins III: The New Missouri Compromise? 125 EDuC. L. REP.
263 (1998).
179. Keyes, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1282 (D. Colo. 1995).
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between and among various racial and ethnic groups, it would not
grant relief. 8 °
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Advocates, parents, educational leaders, and policy makers as
well as all others who are interested in meeting the needs of gifted
students might wish to consider the following suggestions. 181 As
reflected in National Excellence: A Case for Developing America's
Talent: Part 3: The Future of Education for the Nation's Most Tal-
ented Students, the challenge of meeting the needs of "students
with exceptional talent must be shared by many sectors of society
and levels of government." 1 82
First, advocates must work to ensure legislative action at the na-
tional level. If gifted students are ever to receive the special educa-
tion that they deserve, then their supporters must encourage
Congress to strengthen and expand existing federal legislation per-
tinent to the gifted. Such legislative reform at the national level
should be the priority because gifted students, much like their
peers with disabilities, will not receive protection of their rights
without the passage of federal legislature. Moreover, while states
should and will retain the option of providing greater services than
federal law might dictate, unless a national standard is enacted, it is
unlikely many states will take these steps on their own. While
more than thirty states require the identification of gifted students,
not all of them provide funding for such programs. 83 At a mini
180. The Tenth Circuit dismissed an appeal, addressing gifted education only in a
footnote. Keyes v. Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 1437, 1441 n.4 (10th Cir. 1997).
181. For earlier discussions of some of these recommendations, see Donna Y. Ford
et al., Meeting the Educational Needs of the Gifted: A Legal Imperative, 17 ROEPER
REV. 223 (1995); Charles J. Russo et al., The Educational Rights of Gifted Students:
Lost in the Legal Shuffle? 16 ROEPER REV. 67 (1993); Charles J. Russo et al., The
Kentucky Education Reform Act and Gifted Education: Overlooked or Ignored? Kv.
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS J., Fall 1994 at 1, 1.
182. PAT O'CONNELL Ross, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: A
CASE FOR DEVELOPING AMERICA'S TALENT: PART 3: THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION
FOR THE NATION'S MOST TALENTED STUDENTS 2. This report makes five specific rec-
ommendations, all of which are addressed to some degree in this section of the article:
establish challenging curricular standards; establish high-level learning opportunities;
ensure access to early childhood education; expand opportunities for economically
disadvantaged and minority children; encourage appropriate teacher training and
technical assistance; and ensure that high-achieving students in the United States
match or exceed the performance of high-achieving students anywhere in the world.
Id. at 2-3.
183. If the IDEA is to serve as an example, it is worth noting that as of July 1, 1974,
about one year prior to the Act's passage, the Bureau for the Education of the Handi-
capped estimated that 78.5% of eligible children nationwide received some form of
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mum, federal legislation should provide a comprehensive defini-
tion of giftedness, install substantive and procedural'84
safeguards, 85 mandate the identification of gifted students, require
the delivery of programs, and offer financial support to states and
local school systems that exceeds the paltry sums that have been
allocated to date. 86
Second, state legislatures, working in conjunction with their de-
partments of education and colleges of education, must marshal
their efforts to meet the needs of all gifted students. A central goal
of cooperation between these key players should be to strengthen
certification and licensing standards for all prospective teachers 187
and administrators. This should assist all prospective educators to
better serve gifted children. At the same time, schools and colleges
of education, in accordance with the standards of appropriate ac-
crediting agencies, should expand existing course work and field
experiences so that all prospective educators can have better expo-
sure to gifted children and their needs. While it may not be feasi-
ble to require separate courses on gifted students in general
formation programs, at the very least, especially for colleges and
universities that are located in states that do not require teacher
certification for educators who will work with the gifted, an intro-
public education. However, only 47.8% of these children received both special educa-
tion and related services, while 30.7% did not receive related services and 21.5% did
not receive any special education services. H.R. REP. No. 94-332, 94th Cong. (1975).
184. See generally Donna Y. Ford & Michelle Frazier, The Office for Civil Rights
and Non-Discriminatory Testing, Policies, and Procedures: Implications for Gifted Ed-
ucation, 23 ROEPER REV. 109 (2000) (discussing the role of the Office of Civil Rights
in securing the rights of culturally and linguistically diverse students); Frances A.
Karnes et al., The Office of Civil Rights and the Gifted: An Update, 19 ROEPER REV.
162 (1997) (reviewing thirty-eight investigations of the Office of Civil Rights, the
agency responsible for monitoring educational activities for a variety of programs,
including those for the gifted); Frances A. Karnes & Ronald G. Marquardt, The Frag-
mented Framework of Legal Protection for the Gifted, 72 PEABODY J. EDUC. 166
(1997) (discussing dispute procedures employed in resolving disagreements related to
gifted students).
185. For a study of state due process actions protecting the rights of the gifted, see
Frances A. Karnes et al., Due Process in Gifted Education, 20 ROEPER REV. 297
(1998) and Frances A. Karnes et al., A Survey of Mediation Opportunities in Gifted
Education, GIFTED CHILD TODAY MAG., May-June 1998, at 46.
186. For further support of this position, see Mary Lou Herring, Note, Model Fed-
eral Statute for the Education of the Talented and Gifted, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1035
(1991).
187. See Frances A. Karnes & James E. Whorton, Teacher Certification and En-
dorsement in Gifted Education: A Critical Need, 19 ROEPER REV. 54, 54 (1996); Mary
F. Toll, The Importance of Teacher Preparation Programs To Appropriately Serve Stu-
dents Who Are Gifted, 12 UNDERSTANDING OUR GiFrtED, Winter 2000, at 14.
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ductory course on exceptionality should devote a significant
amount of time and interest to gifted children.
Third, at the school level, educational leaders should provide
professional in-house preparation programs to assist school person-
nel to identify and assess gifted students while still providing them
with challenging course work and other educational experiences to
assist them to reach their full potential. Concomitantly, educators
should deliver programs for children of all ages,188 beginning in
pre-school, 189 to address, and redress past and on-going inequities
by paying particular attention to the needs of poor,190 urban,' 91 and
minority' 92 children who have been historically under-represented
in programs for the gifted. Schools, especially in states that do not
follow the lead of jurisdictions such as Pennsylvania, which pro-
vides written IEPs for gifted students,1 93 should make ADA-like
curricular accommodations designed to challenge the gifted to
188. The IDEA, for example, includes specific provisions dealing with pre-school
children. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1474 (1994); Early Intervention Programs for Infants and
Toddlers with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. §§ 303.1-303.654 (1994).
189. For a discussion of this approach, see Naomi Sankar-DeLeeuw, Gifted
Preschoolers: Parent and Teacher Views on Identification, Early Admission and Pro-
gramming, 21 ROEPER REV. 174 (1999).
190. NATIONAL EXCELLENCE: PART 2, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that "[o]nly nine
percent of students in gifted and talented education programs were in the bottom
quartile of family income, while forty-seven percent of program participants were
from the top quartile in family income"). See, e.g. Paul D. Slocumb & Ruby K. Payne,
Identifying and Nurturing the Gifted Poor, PRINCIPAL, May 2000, at 28 (discussing the
needs of gifted students from poverty backgrounds).
191. See, e.g., Donna Y. Ford, The Underrepresentation of Minority Students in
Gifted Education: Problems and Promises in Recruitment and Retention, J. OF SPECIAL
EDUC., May 1998, at 4 (focusing in particular on students in urban settings); Sally M.
Reis & Eva I. Diaz, Economically Disadvantaged Urban Female Students Who
Achieve in Schools, URB. REV., Mar. 1999, at 31 (examining the experiences of nine
high ability, high achieving students).
192. For discussions of the under-representation of minority students, in programs
for the gifted, see Cynthia N. Brown, Gifted Identification as a Constitutional Issue, 19
ROEPER REV. 157 (1997) (noting specifically that African-American Hispanic, and
Native American children were under-represented in thirty-four states in data from
1980 and 1992); Donna Y. Ford, Desegregating Gifted Education: A Need Unmet, 64 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 52 (1995); James J. Gallagher, Education of Gifted Students: A Civil
Rights Issue?, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Jan. 1995, at 408; J. John Harris & Donna Y. Ford,
Hope Deferred Again: Minority Students Underrepresented in Gifted Programs, EDUC.
& URB. Soc'Y, Feb. 1999, at 225; June C. Maker, Identification of Gifted Minority
Students: A National Problem, Needed Changes and A Promising Solution, GIFIED
CHILD Q., Winter 1996, at 41; Donna Y. Ford & Karen S. Webb, Desegregation of
Gifted Educational Programs: The Impact of Brown on Underachieving Children of
Color, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 358 (1994) and Ronna Vanderslice, Hispanic Children and
Giftedness: Why the Difficulty in Identification? 64 DELTA KAPPA GAMMA BULL.,
Spring 1998, at 18.
193. See supra notes 127-127 for the discussion of the regulation.
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reach their full potential. Among the accommodations that educa-
tors might consider are adding additional classes and appropriate
assignments for students who are deprived of a right to a full pro-
gram of gifted education.
Finally, given the key role of parents in the growth and develop-
ment of their children, school officials should work with them to
assist them in nurturing the development of their children.' 94 In
particular, and as appropriate, school officials should offer a range
of services including classes on parenting, child development, and
working with children to enhance their chances for success. Fur-
ther, school officials, perhaps in conjunction with local, regional,
and state associations as well as local colleges and universities,
might wish to consider bringing in outside experts on the gifted
who can offer workshops to parents of gifted children
CONCLUSION
As the nation stands poised on the brink of the new millennium,
it is time to redress the ongoing inequity of failing to provide equal
educational opportunities for gifted children. If these children are
to reach their full potential, then educational leaders and policy
makers need to consider ways to assist these children in their de-
velopment for their own good and the welfare of the nation.
194. For articles in support of this position, see for example Mary Radaszwski-
Byrne, Parents as Instructional Partners in the Education of Gifted Children: A Par-
ent's Perspective, GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Spring 2001, at 32; Kristin R. Stephens, Par-
ents of the Gifted and Talented: The Forgotten Partner, GIFTED CHILD TODAY, Sept.-
Oct. 1999, at 38; Carol Strip & Gretchen Hirsch, Trust and Teamwork: The Parent-
Teacher Partmership for Helping the Gifted Child, GiFTED CHILD TODAY, Spring
2001, at 26.
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